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“You don’t simply say ‘I’m sorry’ to the man you’ve robbed. You return 
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INTRODUCTION 
Much to the dismay of the overly optimistic or naïve among us, the United 
States continues to be plagued by the vestiges of our vile beginnings. The 
enslavement of Africans and their descendants was an integral component of 
those beginnings and the subsequent development of the United States as a 
nation. African Americans were dominated, controlled, and considered less than 
human, all for the benefit of the country and its white citizens. The 
institutionalized racial hierarchy that began nearly 400 years ago continues to 
stifle the nation’s progress toward racial equality. Indeed, despite the widely-
touted expectation in 2008 that the election of America’s first African American 
President signaled the emergence of a “post-racial” America, the 2012 re-
election of the same African American to the White House has actually served to 
further illuminate the deep-seated racial animosity still present in today’s 
society.2 
Domination and elaborate control of Africans in colonial America, and later 
the United States, were exerted to provide the requisite framework for the 
economically profitable slave trade.3 Long after the formal end of slavery, 
slavery apologists characterized the aims of slavery in pseudo-paternalistic terms 
as “training” and “civilizing . . . the untutored savage.”4 For decades, the United 
States and local governments continued to exercise their domination by 
enforcing a national system of slavery, racial segregation, and discrimination.5 
That system of laws and government-sanctioned norms became so pervasive and 
2. See generally Paul Banahene Adjei & Jagjeet Kaur Gill, What Has Barack Obama’s 
Election Victory Got to do with Race? A Closer Look at Post-Racial Rhetoric and Its Implication 
for Antiracism Education, 16 RACE ETHNICITY & EDUC. 134 (2013) (discussing the realities of race 
in the United States and Canada in the years since Obama’s election and the fallacies of “post-
racial” thinking). Political attacks laden with racial overtones and comments are evidence that we 
still live in a country where one’s skin color is used to criticize, mock, and ridicule. See id. at 145–
49. 
3. See JOHN HOPE FRANKLIN & ALFRED A. MOSS JR., FROM SLAVERY TO FREEDOM: A 
HISTORY OF AFRICAN AMERICANS 45, 132–37 (8th ed. 2000). 
4. ROY L. BROOKS, ATONEMENT AND FORGIVENESS: A NEW MODEL FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 
149 (2004) [hereinafter BROOKS, ATONEMENT]. 
5. See, e.g., id. at 34 (discussing the federal government’s role as a “front-line perpetrator” of 
atrocities on Africans and African Americans). 
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commonly accepted that it has been personified as “Jim Crow.”6 As a result, 
racial hierarchy is firmly entrenched in American society, a hierarchy evident in 
current American educational, justice, and economic systems.7 The nearly 400-
year-old injury caused by institutionalized racial supremacy and discrimination 
in America has yet to heal. Reparations have been sought as a remedy for those 
injustices for nearly as long.8 
The precepts of reconciliation—apology, atonement, and forgiveness—are 
woven into the core of humanity.9 Apology, the first precept, is not possible until 
the malefactor acknowledges their error while expressing regret.10 Until very 
recently, no apology for the atrocities of slavery had been made, and even the 
suggestion that such an apology was warranted was controversial.11 In 2003, 
President George W. Bush acknowledged that the Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade 
was “one of the greatest crimes of history” and even went as far as to recognize 
that the United States was “[a] republic founded on equality for all [that] became 
a prison for millions.”12 Notably, President Bush was careful not to explicitly 
apologize for United States-sanctioned and enforced slavery.13 It was not until 
2009 that both houses of Congress passed resolutions to apologize for slavery 
and the subsequent government-enforced segregation.14 Those resolutions, 
however, failed to take the next step in the reconciliation process by atoning for 
what was stolen. In fact, the Senate apology expressly disclaims any right to 
monetary reparations for the millions of African Americans denigrated and 
harmed by the government’s actions.15 As a result, the precepts of reconciliation 
6. See FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 3, at 290.
7. See generally GLORIA J. BROWNE-MARSHALL, RACE, LAW AND AMERICAN SOCIETY: 1607
TO PRESENT (2d ed. 2013) (detailing America’s legal history of racial discrimination against 
Blacks, Asians, and Native Americans). 
8. The first reparations lawsuit was filed in 1915 by Cornelius J. Jones. See Johnson v.
McAdoo, 45 App. D.C. 440 (1916), aff’d, 244 U.S. 643 (1917). However, demands for reparations 
began prior to the end of slavery. See Adjoa A. Aiyetoro & Adrienne D. Davis, Historic and 
Modern Social Movements for Reparations: The National Coalition of Blacks for Reparations in 
America (N’Cobra) and Its Antecedents, 16 TEX. WESLEYAN L. REV. 687, 693 & n.16 (2010) 
(citing DAVID WALKER, DAVID WALKER’S APPEAL 80 (Black Classic Press 1993) (1830)). David 
Walker’s Appeal was published in 1830 and consisted of four letters to African Americans urging 
a revolution and Black unity while imploring whites to recognize the injustice of slavery. See also 
Aiyetoro & Davis, supra, at 693 (discussing Sojourner Truth’s petition for land to be redistributed 
to former slaves).  
9. See BROOKS, ATONEMENT, supra note 4, at 143 (discussing his formula for racial
reconciliation in America: “atonement—apology and reparation—plus forgiveness”). 
10. See id. at 142.
11. See, e.g., ROY L. BROOKS, WHEN SORRY ISN’T ENOUGH: THE CONTROVERSY OVER
APOLOGIES AND REPARATIONS FOR HUMAN JUSTICE 352, 355, 370 (1999) (describing how President 
Clinton avoided formally apologizing for slavery and opposed reparations). 
12. ALFRED L. BROPHY, REPARATIONS: PRO & CON 203–04 (2006).
13. Id. at 13.
14. See S. Con. Res. 26, 111th Cong. (2009); H.R. Res. 194, 110th Cong. (2008).
15. S. Con. Res. 26.
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have not yet been applied by the United States in its efforts to achieve racial 
reconciliation. 
Legal scholars have made extensive and significant contributions to the 
reparations debate and movement. Proponents of reparations have written on the 
prospect of making the international, tort, civil, and/or legislative case for 
reparations.16 Numerous articles have also been produced to support the position 
that there can be no legal remedy for reparations for slavery and discrimination 
in the United States.17 This article aims to add to the reparations scholarship by 
comparing the common law trust relationship between the United States 
government and African Americans to the government’s common law trust 
relationship with Native Americans. That common law trust relationship can and 
should be a vehicle for establishing an equitable right to African American post-
slavery reparations claims. In order to secure those damages, a viable waiver of 
sovereign immunity must be established. This article will also explore the 
establishment of a waiver of sovereign immunity by the United States for the 
disbursement of slave reparations. Existing Native American trust case law 
supports the argument that a breach of common law trust duties provides 
plaintiffs a right to an accounting from the government as well as a substantive 
right to monetary damages. 
It has been written that there are no legal similarities in the relationships 
between the United States government and Native Americans and that of the 
government’s relationship with African Americans.18 This article seeks to 
16. See generally Alfred L. Brophy, Reparations Talk: Reparations for Slavery and the Tort
Law Analogy, 24 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 81 (2004) (exploring the applicability of tort law and 
unjust enrichment claims to securing reparations for slavery and Jim Crow discrimination); Keith 
N. Hylton, Slavery and Tort Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1209 (2004) (discussing damages and injuries
suffered by slaves and examining the potential use of tort law and derivative claims to remedy
those injuries); Patricia Muhammad, The Trans-Atlantic Slave Trade: A Legacy Establishing a
Case for International Reparations, 3 COLUM. J. RACE & L. 147 (2013) (evaluating reparations
through the lens of international conventions and criminal statues); Charles J. Ogletree, Jr.,
Repairing the Past: New Efforts in the Reparations Debate in America, 38 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 279 (2003) (arguing that African American reparations are necessary to redress both slavery
and Jim Crow and exploring the various legal theories and legislative strategies employed to secure
them); Kaimipono David Wenger, Causation and Attenuation in the Slavery Reparations Debate,
40 U.S.F. L. REV. 279 (2006) (analyzing the arguments against reparations based on the purported
attenuation between the harms suffered during slavery and modern plaintiffs’ injuries); Robert
Westley, Many Billions Gone: Is It Time to Reconsider the Case for Black Reparations?, 19 B.C.
THIRD WORLD L.J. 429 (1998) (utilizing critical legalism to argue that reparations can be used to
remedy the shortcomings of affirmative action efforts).
17. See generally David Horowitz, Unsavory Black Insinuations: A Reply to David Boyle,
105 W. VA. L. REV. 699 (2003) (offering ten reasons why reparations claims lack a strong legal 
basis); Robert A. Sedler, Claims for Reparations for Racism Undermine the Struggle for Equality, 
3 J.L. SOC’Y 119 (2002) (arguing that continued calls for slavery reparations will only erode white 
support for racial equality in America).  
18. See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1108 (9th Cir. 1995) (“[R]egardless of
whether there are factual similarities between the treatment accorded Indian Tribes and African 
American slaves and their descendants (as Cato contends), there is nothing in the relationship 
between the United States and any other persons, including African American slaves and their 
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counter that statement. Part I explores previous African American reparations 
claims and the common barriers to those claims. Part II discusses the legal 
construct of common law trusts and the requisite duties applicable to common 
law trust relationships as detailed in four notable Native American trust cases. 
Part III, through analogy to the Native American trust relationship, explores the 
creation of the government’s common law trust relationship with African 
Americans and its subsequent breach. Part IV argues the breach of common law 
trust duties should provide African Americans a right to monetary damages and 
injunctive relief as reparations. 
I. 
AN OVERVIEW OF AFRICAN AMERICAN REPARATIONS CLAIMS 
Attempts to adjudicate the legal merits of slave reparations against the 
United States government date back to 1916.19 Those attempts have continued 
over nearly a century without any success. The absence of a successful claim for 
African American reparations is unique. The government has recognized the 
merit and necessity of apologizing and providing compensation to atone for its 
past wrongs against other minorities. Specifically, the United States legislated 
payment of reparations to Japanese Americans who were interned during World 
War II.20 In fact, as an international leader, the United States has not only 
demanded that other nations apologize for their own misdeeds but also has 
routinely intervened with military action to halt the oppressive acts of foreign 
governments against their own marginalized citizens.21 
American courts served as sympathetic venues for reparation claims made 
by Jewish Holocaust survivors against Swiss banks, German banks, corporations 
and insurance companies.22 The U.S. government has also played a role in 
political negotiations aimed at securing Holocaust reparations.23 In 1997, 
Congress, in bold and hypocritical fashion, passed the Lipinski Resolution 
demanding that Japan pay immediate reparations and give a clear apology for its 
wrongful acts against others during World War II.24 Moreover, various federal 
descendants, that is legally comparable to the unique relationship between the United States and 
Indian Tribes.”). 
19. See Johnson v. McAdoo, 45 App. D.C. 440 (1916), aff’d, 244 U.S. 643 (1917).
20. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. § 1989 (1988) (expired 1998).
21. The United States government has opted to deploy military troops into foreign territory
for the purpose of ending attacks against civilians deemed to be crimes against humanity. For 
example, it was estimated, as of September 2011, that the United States spent over one billion 
dollars on the military intervention in Libya. See, e.g., John Barry, America’s Secret Libya War, 
DAILY BEAST (Aug. 30, 2011, 2:12 AM), http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2011/08/30
/america-s-secret-libya-war-u-s-spent-1-billion-on-covert-ops-helping-nato.html. 
22. BROPHY, supra note 12, at 45–46; Burt Neuborne, Holocaust Reparations Litigation:
Lessons for the Slavery Reparations Movement, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 615, 615–617 
(2003). 
23. See BROPHY, supra note 12, at 45.
24. BROOKS, ATONEMENT, supra note 4, at xiii.
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courts and the Supreme Court have remedied past government mismanagement 
of Native American property and funds by ordering that the government provide 
accountings and payments to Native Americans.25 
Prior lawsuits seeking African American reparations in American courts 
have been unsuccessful. These claims sought to remedy the purported tortious, 
racist, and/or inequitable treatment suffered by slaves and their descendants. 
Private corporations,26 state municipalities,27 and the federal government28 have 
been named defendants in the actions. The claims against those defendants have 
attempted to recover damages for inequitable gains related to unjust enrichment 
from slave labor,29 receipt of tax proceeds on cotton cultivated and harvested by 
slave labor,30 insurance proceeds earned from policies that insured the purchase 
of slaves,31 and the tortious acts committed against Blacks during the American 
slave trade.32 
Lawsuits against the government by descendants of enslaved Africans that 
sought to secure judicial remedies for the injustice of slavery and discrimination 
have failed. A common refrain found in the dismissals of those suits points to the 
inadequacy of the judiciary to address reparations claims because of doctrinal 
barriers such as sovereign immunity, statutes of limitations, and standing.33 The 
doctrine of sovereign immunity is one of a few legal constructs routinely cited as 
a major impediment to plaintiffs’ attempts to recover monetary damages from 
the federal government.34 As discussed below, however, sovereign immunity 
should not be considered a fatal flaw to reparations claims for African 
Americans. 
25. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 424 (1980) (holding that
legislation appropriating Sioux Nation land constituted a taking for which just compensation must 
be paid); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111, 116–18 (1938) (holding that value of 
compensation owed to Shoshone Tribe for land taken by the United States included value of 
minerals and lumber); Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1094, 1110 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (concluding 
that the Interior Department was “still unable to execute the most fundamental of trust duties—an 
accurate accounting”). 
26. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 759, 762 (7th Cir. 2006).
27. Alexander v. Oklahoma, 382 F.3d 1206 (10th Cir. 2004).
28. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103 (9th Cir. 1995).
29. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d at 757.
30. Johnson v. McAdoo, 45 App. D.C. 440, 441 (1916), aff’d, 244 U.S. 643 (1917).
31. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d at 759.
32. Id. at 760. See also Cato, 70 F.3d at 1106.
33. See In re African-American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d at 759, 762 (concluding
that plaintiffs lacked standing to sue and that claims were barred by statutes of limitations); Cato, 
70 F.3d at 1107 (concluding that reparations suit was barred by sovereign immunity); Obadele v. 
United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432, 440 (2002) (concluding that plaintiffs were not entitled to 
restitution under statutory scheme aimed at compensating Japanese victims of internment), aff’d, 
61 F. App’x 705 (Fed. Cir. 2003).  
34. See generally Ogletree, supra note 16 (discussing the numerous legal barriers to a
reparations claim). Identifying a waiver to sovereign immunity for African American reparations 
claims is the primary focus of this article’s argument.  
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A. Waivers of Sovereign Immunity
The common law doctrine of sovereign immunity has routinely been cited 
as a barrier to reparations claims. The doctrine, which originated in England, is 
based on the notion that the royal government—in its sovereignty—cannot be 
sued by its subjects without its consent.35 The concept of sovereign immunity 
has been inherited as a staple of American government. The doctrine is often 
expressed by the idea that “the King can do no wrong.”36 However, it has been 
argued that this phrase meant precisely the opposite of what it does today.37 “It 
meant that the king must not, was not allowed, not entitled, to do wrong . . . .” 
Thus, while the King would not issue writs against himself, he could consent to 
suit to “let justice be done.”38 
This doctrine, in the original English context, did not have a determinative 
impact on the right of subjects to get redress when the government acted 
illegally.39 To the contrary, the English system was specifically designed to 
allow its subjects to obtain relief against the government.40 The formality of 
sovereign immunity for the English did not serve as a fatal blow to the potential 
plaintiffs.41 In fact, the government regularly consented to suits against it 
brought by English subjects.42 
Like the English system, although one may successfully file suit against the 
United States for injunctive relief or declaratory judgment, one cannot win 
monetary damages without consent or the passage of a bill by Congress.43 The 
English doctrine of sovereign immunity has been significantly altered by 
American law, however, in that the American system lacks the workarounds 
developed in the English system.44 The American interpretation does not provide 
for routine consent from the government to be sued.45 Instead, American citizens 
are only permitted to sue the government if their claims fall within one of the 
few exemptions enacted and sanctioned by the government.46 The American 
system allows the government—the alleged wrongdoer in instances where 
sovereign immunity is invoked—to dictate when it will be exposed to liability. 
35. CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, ARTHUR R. MILLER & EDWARD H. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE 
AND PROCEDURE § 3654 (3d ed. 1998). 
36. Id.
37. Louis L. Jaffe, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Sovereign Immunity, 77 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 3–4 (1963).
38. Id. at 4.
39. Id. at 18.
40. See Jaffe, supra note 37, at 3.
41. Id.
42. See id. at 3.
43. See id. at 5–6.
44. Id. at 6 (discussing how real property suits in which the Crown held an interest could be
initiated without consent). 
45. WRIGHT, MILLER & COOPER, supra note 35, § 3654.
46. Id.
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The instinct of self-preservation is a reality that undoubtedly tempts any 
wrongdoer from voluntarily taking responsibility. Under this framework, it is no 
wonder that the elected politicians in Congress have failed to pass legislation 
expressly permitting reparations claims. The majority of the nation—largely 
Americans—with the power to elect those politicians will not support providing 
reparations payments to the descendants of African slaves.47 
The doctrine of federal sovereign immunity was not written into the U.S. 
Constitution.48 Professor Erwin Chemerinsky has forcefully argued that it is 
inconsistent with American democracy and the Constitution.49 Most importantly, 
there is one glaring difference between England and the United States in this 
context: the American federal government was not set up as a monarchy. Yet, 
even without concrete evidence that the Framers intended for sovereign 
immunity to be a part of American democracy, the concept has permeated the 
common law. In 1821, Chief Justice John Marshall announced that “[t]he 
universally received opinion is, that no suit can be commenced or prosecuted 
against the United States.”50 The Ninth Circuit has described the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity as “axiomatic.”51 However, even in the face of such 
language and such closely held beliefs, several exceptions to the doctrine of 
sovereign immunity have been established.52 
Exceptions to the doctrine of sovereign immunity have typically been 
enacted by Congress.53 Historically, if an individual wanted to sue the federal 
government, the injured party had to request that Congress pass a private bill 
concerning her specific suit.54 Not surprisingly, this process produced mixed 
results.55 Citizens needed experience and knowledge of how to proceed through 
Congress when seeking passage of their bills.56 Even when a citizen possessed 
the requisite familiarity with the bill passage process, her fate rested heavily on 
the current composition of Congress.57 In response to these issues, Congress 
passed the Court of Claims Act in 1855.58 The Court of Claims was formed to 
resolve claims based upon federal laws or regulations, or upon contracts with the 
47. See BROOKS, ATONEMENT, supra note 4, at xi.
48. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1205 (2001)
(arguing that the doctrine of sovereign immunity is contrary to the historical and legal principles of 
American government).  
49. See generally id.
50. Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 411–12 (1821).
51. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Baker v. United States,
817 F.2d 560, 562 (9th Cir. 1987)). 
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federal government.59 Before a decision of the Court could be made final, it had 
to be approved by Congress.60 As a result, a plaintiff’s claim was still subject to 
unpredictable outcomes should the composition of the Congress change. The 
United States government remained in need of a more routine process to achieve 
more consistent results. To that end, two pieces of legislation were enacted: the 
Federal Tort Claims Act and the Tucker Act. 
1. The Federal Tort Claims Act
The Federal Tort Claims Act (“FTCA”) was enacted in 1946 as a sovereign
immunity waiver for certain types of tort claims. The FTCA grants federal courts 
jurisdiction over claims against the federal government for “negligent or 
wrongful act[s] or omission[s],” including claims for money damages, if a 
private person would be similarly liable.61  
While the FTCA provides a mechanism for plaintiffs to sue the federal 
government, certain procedural limitations make bringing a suit under the FTCA 
very different from the traditional tort suit. For example, jury trials are not 
available under the FTCA.62 Additionally, before claims reach a court under this 
provision, they must be brought before the proper governmental agency.63 Only 
once all administrative remedies have been exhausted can FTCA claims be filed 
in federal court. The available remedies do not include punitive damages or pre-
judgment interest.64 
Finally, government liability under the FTCA is based on individual 
liability, but the individuals responsible for passing (or not passing) legislation, 
Congresspersons and Senators, enjoy absolute immunity from suit under Article 
I, Section 6 of the Constitution.65 Given the statute’s limitations and 
requirements, it seems certain that the FTCA cannot provide a viable avenue to 
damages in the quest for African American slave and discrimination reparations. 
This roadblock, however, does not foreclose the availability of reparations from 
the government for breaches it committed in violation of the duties that arise as a 
result of the government’s post-slavery common law trust relationship with 
African Americans. 
2. The Tucker Act
The Tucker Act (the “Act”), passed in 1887 by Congress, replaced the
previously unwieldy and unpredictable practice of requesting a waiver of 
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1346, 2674 (2012).
62. Id. § 2402.
63. Id. § 2675.
64. Id. § 2674.
65. Supreme Court of Va. v. Consumers Union of the U.S., Inc., 446 U.S. 719, 731 (1980);
Eastland v. U.S. Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503 (1975). 
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sovereign immunity for each potential suit an individual wished to file against 
the government.66 The Act provided a means by which routine claims for 
monetary contract damages could be brought against the United States.67 The 
legislative history of the Act reveals that it was “designed to give the people of 
the United States what every civilized nation of the world has already done—the 
right to go into the courts to seek redress against the Government for their 
grievances.”68 Jurisdiction was given to both the Court of Claims and the federal 
district courts to hear and decide claims brought against the United States 
“founded either upon the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any regulation 
of an executive department, or upon any express or implied contract with the 
United States, or for liquidated or non-liquidated damages in cases not sounding 
in tort.”69 In other words, for cases involving contracts, the Constitution, federal 
statutes, admiralty, or non-tort claims, the government has waived its immunity. 
If the claim is for damages of $10,000 or less, then both the Court of Claims and 
the federal district court have jurisdiction.70 The Court of Claims has exclusive 
jurisdiction over cases involving claims of more than $10,000.71 
Courts have recognized that the Indian Tucker Act72 is very similar in 
purpose and design to that of the original Tucker Act.73 The original Tucker Act 
barred Indian Tribal claims from United States courts.74 The Indian Tucker Act, 
passed in 1949, reflected a legislative acknowledgment that the United States 
had assumed a fiduciary obligation towards Native Americans.75 A report 
released by the House of Representatives cautioned that, “[i]f we fail to meet 
these obligations by denying access to the courts when trust funds have been 
improperly dissipated or other fiduciary duties have been violated, we 
compromise the national honor of the United States.”76 Thus, the Indian Tucker 
Act has at times been treated as an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity.77 
However, as explored below, this waiver does not automatically provide Native 
American plaintiffs with access to monetary damages from the government. 
Relatively recent suits seeking African American reparations have relied on 
the FTCA and the Tucker Act to support their claims. As discussed below, courts 
have rejected these claims without proper consideration of how the 
66. 1-6A STEIN, MITCHELL & MEZINES, supra note 52, § 6A.02.
67. See United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 213–14 (1983); 5-45 STEIN,
MITCHELL & MEZINES, supra note 52, § 45.05. 
68. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 213–14 (internal quotations omitted).
69. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012).
70. 5-45 STEIN, MITCHELL & MEZINES, supra note 52, § 45.05.
71. Id.
72. 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012).
73. See, e.g., Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 214–15.
74. Id. at 214.
75. Id. at 214–15 (quoting legislative history referring to the government’s “obligations” and
“fiduciary duties” towards Indian funds and property). 
76. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 215.
77. See, e.g., id. at 214–16.
HARDAWAY_11.12.15_FINAL_AN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/15  2:38 PM 
2015] A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS 535 
government’s common law trust relationship with African Americans factors 
into the legal analysis. 
B. Notable African American Reparations Claims
There have been a number of reparations suits filed in U.S. courts. Some 
decisions have acknowledged that there is a moral argument to claims for 
reparations.78 Nonetheless, several courts have found that the actions are time-
barred79 by the six-year statute of limitations for civil suits against the United 
States and that the government has not consented to be sued by African 
Americans for reparations.80 As a result, African American reparations suits 
have been routinely dismissed within the American court system. 
Individual cases have been filed as pro se claims against the United States. 
Many of these suits were allowed by the courts to be filed in forma pauperis.81 
A 2002 suit in the United States Court of Federal Claims utilized a unique 
approach to the struggle to attain slave reparations. Obadele v. United States82 
involved three African American male plaintiffs seeking redress for the wrongs 
suffered by their ancestors as members of the African American race during and 
after slavery. The Obadele plaintiffs filed claims with the Justice Department 
Civil Rights Division, Office of Redress Administration (“ORA”).83 The claims 
were filed near the expiration of the Civil Liberties Act of 1988.84 The Civil 
Liberties Act provided an apology to individuals of Japanese ancestry from the 
government for those who were evacuated, relocated, or interned during World 
War II.85 It also authorized the ORA to make reparations to successful claimants 
in the amount of $20,000.86 The ORA denied the plaintiffs’ application based on 
their failure to meet the threshold criteria of Japanese ancestry.87 Plaintiff 
78. See Jackson v. United States, No. C 94-01494 CW, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7872, at *1
(N.D. Cal. June 7, 1994) (commenting that “[t]he moral weight of Plaintiff’s charges cannot be 
gainsaid”); Obadele v. United States, 52 Fed. Cl. 432, 442 (2002), aff’d, 61 F. App’x (Fed. Cir. 
2003). 
79. See, e.g., Powell v. United States, No. C 94-01877 CW, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8628, at
*1 (N.D. Cal. June 20, 1994).
80. 28 U.S.C. § 2401(a) (2012).
81. In forma pauperis is a Latin phrase that means the plaintiff has been declared indigent for
the purposes of the case and therefore is permitted to file the suit at no cost. Proceeding carries 
substantial risks. Federal law authorizes courts to dismiss in forma pauperis complaints even 
before the defendant has been served if the court determines that the complaint is frivolous or fails 
to state a claim for relief. 28 U.S.C § 1915(e)(2)(B) (2012). This provision has spelled a quick end 
for reparations suits filed in forma pauperis. See, e.g., Powell, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8628; 
Jackson, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7872; Lloyd v. United States, No. C 94-01192 CW, 1994 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 7869 (N.D. Cal. June 7, 1994). 
82. 52 Fed. Cl. 432 (2002).
83. Id. at 434–35.
84. Civil Liberties Act of 1988, 50 U.S.C. app. § 1989b (1988) (expired 1998).
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. Obadele, 52 Fed. Cl. at 435.
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Obadele subsequently filed a timely appeal to the Assistant Attorney General for 
the Civil Rights Division.88 That appeal specifically requested that the Attorney 
General seek an extension of the Civil Liberties Act from Congress to include 
Dr. Obadele and other individuals similarly situated.89 After considering Dr. 
Obadele’s administrative appeal over the course of six months, the Assistant 
Attorney General denied the appeal on the same day the ORA program was 
scheduled to expire by statute.90 The Assistant Attorney General informed Dr. 
Obadele, at that time, of his right to seek judicial review of the denial within 
sixty days.91 
Plaintiff Obadele filed a timely appeal with the Court of Claims asserting a 
right to remedy under the Civil Liberties Act and asserting jurisdiction under the 
Tucker Act.92 The government sought dismissal of the case or, in the alternative, 
a judgment based on the administrative record.93 The court denied the motion to 
dismiss based on the express grant of jurisdiction in the Civil Liberties Act for 
judicial review of denied claims, regardless of whether the persons seeking 
review are in fact eligible for compensation.94 
The court ultimately found that plaintiffs were not entitled to reparations 
under the Civil Liberties Act.95 Over the government’s assertions that the court’s 
analysis could go no further, the court proceeded to consider the plaintiffs’ 
arguments that the racial requirement for compensation violated equal protection 
and due process.96 The court employed a strict scrutiny analysis and upheld the 
Civil Liberties Act, agreeing with other courts to consider the question that the 
statutory scheme was a permissible “race-conscious” remedial measure and that 
it was narrowly tailored to address specific instances of prior governmental 
racial discrimination.97 As a result, the Court of Claims affirmed the ORA’s 
88. Id. The Assistant Attorney General accepted the administrative appeal of Dr. Obadele and
exchanged correspondence with him regarding the need for additional documentation to support 
the appeal. Id. 
89. Id. Dr. Obadele’s request specifically asked for the compensation amount for individuals
of African ancestry to be increased to five times the original $20,000 allotted under the Civil 
Liberties Act of 1988. His stated basis for the requested increase was the longer period of racist 
suffering endured by African Americans as opposed to persons of Japanese ancestry. Id.  
90. Id. The agency informed Dr. Obadele that he was not eligible because he was neither of
Japanese ancestry nor the spouse or parent of such a person. Id. 
91. Id.
92. Id. at 433.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 437.
95. Id. at 440.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 443 (citing Jacobs v. Barr, 959 F.2d 313 (D.C. Cir. 1992)). Notably, the court in
Jacobs faced a German plaintiff who had been interned during World War II. In rejecting his 
constitutional challenge, the court emphasized the government’s interest in remedying past racial 
discrimination, which Germans did not face. While granting relief to descendants of interned 
Japanese Americans but denying it to descendants of interned Germans serves the interest of 
remedying past discrimination, granting it to persons of Japanese ancestry but denying it to persons 
of African ancestry does not, because the latter group suffered specific, racialized discrimination 
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administrative ruling and held that the denial of plaintiffs’ claims by the ORA 
was not contrary to law.98 
Reparations suits seeking to recoup monies from corporate entities that 
financially benefited from slavery have also been filed. The consolidated case of 
In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation99 was filed on behalf of 
the descendants of African American slaves seeking recovery for violations of 
various state laws and the Civil Rights Act of 1866.100 The consolidated 
complaint alleged that defendant corporations provided services to slave owners, 
and that some defendants owned and trafficked in slaves, in violation of 
Northern anti-slavery state laws and, in some cases, of the Thirteenth 
Amendment.101 
The Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court’s dismissal. 
The court concluded that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue on behalf of their 
ancestors’ estates.102 Nor could the plaintiffs claim injury to themselves by 
virtue of what had been done to their ancestors, according to the court, because it 
would be an “impossible” task to connect remote past harm to a modern person’s 
condition or calculate the appropriate damages.103 As the court summarily 
opined, “the wrong to the ancestor is not a wrong to the descendant.”104 The 
court stated that calculating the economic damages owed to any specific plaintiff 
would be impossible105—arguably eliding the role that discovery and expert 
economists could play in litigation. With regard to the statute of limitations, the 
court reasoned that it would be impermissible to toll the statute for a century or 
more and further opined, without basis or support, that some courts in the North 
and the South would have been receptive to reparations suits within the 
permissible filing deadlines.106 
In 1995, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that plaintiffs lacked 
standing to sue for injury caused to all African Americans as a result of 
discrimination.107 The court also held that the doctrine of sovereign immunity 
just as the former did. The Obadele court apparently did not recognize this distinction in adopting 
the reasoning of the Jacobs court. 
98. Id. at 444. The court acknowledged that plaintiffs made a compelling political case for
why the harms suffered by African Americans during and after slavery justify redress, and pointed 
to the legislation sponsored by Representative John Conyers as a potential means of rectifying the 
injury. Id. at 442.  
99. 471 F.3d 754 (7th Cir. 2006).
100. Id. at 757. See also 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (2012).
101. In re African American Slave Descendants Litig., 471 F.3d 754, 757 (7th Cir. 2006).
102. Id. at 759–62.
103. Id.
104. Id. at 759.
105. Id. at 760. The court elsewhere acknowledged that studies of “intergenerational
mobility” could, in fact, estimate the “aggregate effects” of wrongs like slavery. Id. (citing 
articles). But the court dismissed this because it concluded that one could not prove “that a given 
black American today is worse off by a specific, calculable sum of money.” Id.  
106. Id. at 762.
107. Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1105 (9th Cir. 1995)
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barred their suit.108 Two groups of African American plaintiffs, collectively 
referred to here as Cato, sought compensation in the amount of $100 million for, 
among other things, forced labor, kidnapping, and deprivation of freedom.109 
The plaintiffs also sought “an acknowledgement of the injustice of slavery in the 
United States and in the 13 American colonies between 1619 and 1865, as well 
as of the existence of discrimination against freed slaves and their descendants 
from the end of the Civil War to the present.”110 At issue was whether sovereign 
immunity, or some other jurisdictional problem, barred Cato’s theories of 
liability. The Ninth Circuit found that Cato’s complaint was properly dismissed 
by the lower court, as it neither identified a “constitutional or statutory right that 
was violated” nor asserted “any basis for federal subject matter jurisdiction or 
waiver of sovereign immunity.”111 
In her complaint, Cato argued that the Thirteenth Amendment created a 
national right for African Americans to be free of the badges and incidents of 
slavery, and that as African Americans continue to suffer from the lingering 
incidents of slavery, there should be relief available under the FTCA for 
“intentionally inflicted harm and violation of duty by the federal 
government.”112 Because Cato represented herself, and her complaint did not 
refer to any basis upon which the United States might have consented to suit, the 
district court looked for the most applicable waiver of sovereign immunity and 
settled upon the Federal Tort Claims Act.113 The Ninth Circuit ruled that the 
FTCA was not applicable to suits seeking reparations for at least three distinct 
reasons. First, the court noted that the FTCA, by its terms, is only available for 
claims which accrued on or after January 1, 1945.114 Though the effects of 
slavery and post-Civil War discrimination continued long after 1945, the actual 
enslavement of Africans and their descendants obviously occurred long before 
1945. This provision effectively bars any reparations claims sought by African 
Americans for the wrongful acts committed by the government during slavery 
and thereafter. Second, the FTCA permanently bars all claims brought more than 
two years after their accrual.115 Consequently, assuming tort claims from slavery 
were possible under the FTCA, the statute of limitations requires that the claim 
be filed within two years of the acts.116 Finally, under the FTCA there must be a 
108. Id.
109. Id. at 1106.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 1109.
113. Id. at 1106.
114. Id. at 1107 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1346(b) (2012)).
115. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2401(b) (2012)).
116. The FTCA limitations period might be equitably tolled to account for the long periods of
American history when African Americans were barred, either formally or practically, from 
obtaining relief in most state courts. It is unlikely, however, that any court would entertain the 
argument that this continued to be the case within the past two years, so the point is largely moot. 
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government employee acting, or failing to act, in their official government 
capacity.117 The plaintiffs in Cato claimed that Congress was liable for failing to 
pass reparative legislation, but as the court noted, failure to discharge a 
“discretionary” duty (including legislative duties) is not cognizable under the 
FTCA.118 
Cato aptly argued that the continuing violations doctrine should apply 
because African Americans are still subjected to the badges and incidents of 
slavery and thus that her action should not be barred by the statute of 
limitations.119 Though the court agreed that the doctrine was applicable to 
constitutional and statutory violations, it noted that the doctrine would only help 
to overcome the jurisdictional barrier if the underlying substantive claims were 
viable.120 
The court also found that the analogy to Indian land claim cases presented 
by Cato to be unpersuasive.121 The Ninth Circuit agreed with the government’s 
contention that regardless of whether or not there were factual similarities 
between the treatment accorded Indian tribes and African American slaves and 
their descendants, “there is nothing in the relationship between the United States 
any other persons, including African American slaves and their descendants, that 
is legally comparable to the unique relationship between the United States and 
Indian tribes.”122 The court then reasoned that “[c]ourts have recognized 
fiduciary responsibilities running from the United States to Indian Tribes 
because of specific treaty obligations and a network of statutes that by their own 
terms impose specific duties on the government.”123 The court found nothing 
comparable to this in the Thirteenth Amendment, or in the other Civil War 
amendments or the various Civil Rights Acts, and thus concluded that the 
relationship between the federal government and Indian Tribes did not provide a 
basis for relief in an African American reparations case.124 
The Cato court’s view of the Native American analogy is seriously flawed. 
While the court in Cato saw “no basis in the Indian land cases”125 for awarding 
Cf. In re African-American Slave Descendants Litigation, 471 F.3d 754, 762 (7th Cir. 2006) 
(rejecting a similar argument for tolling). 
117. Cato, 70 F.3d at 1110 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(b) (2012)).
118. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a)).
119. Id. at 1108.
120. Id. at 1109. The court notably did not reject the continuing violations argument for
tolling the statute of limitations; it merely resolved the case on grounds that made the applicability 
of the statute of limitations redundant. While it is prudent not to read too much into a court’s 
decision to not decide an issue it does not have to, this could signal a willingness on the part of the 
Cato court to take seriously the argument for treating racism and the aftermath of slavery as a 
continuing violation. If that is so, it could be a fruitful basis for overcoming time bars in future 





125. Id. at 1108.
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reparations, this author believes that the court should have addressed additional 
relevant factors in its analysis. First, comparable common law relationships exist 
both between Native American and the United States and between African 
Americans and the United States. A more full and complete examination by the 
Cato court of the United States Supreme Court decision in Mitchell II, 
concerning the existence of a common law trust relationship and the fiduciary 
duties that accompany it, would have benefitted both the Cato plaintiffs and the 
court’s analysis. While Cato’s complaint did not make a showing as to the extent 
of the government’s control over African Americans and their property, nothing 
in the Ninth Circuit’s decision indicates that the court ever considered the merit 
of a common law trust relationship in making its decision. 
Second, much of the court’s analysis was devoted to the applicability of the 
FTCA’s waiver of sovereign immunity for plaintiffs’ claims. After holding that 
the FTCA did not provide a cognizable claim, the court stated that Mitchell II 
could not be used to support a waiver of sovereign immunity because Cato’s 
claims did not fall within the Tucker Act.126 Had the claim been brought under 
the Tucker Act, and framed in the language of a breached trust, the court might 
have seen more merit in the comparison to Native American case law.127 
The court’s requirement for a specific treaty or network of statutes is 
misguided. The trust relationship between Native Americans and the national 
government, as recognized by the Supreme Court, did not originate in a statute. 
Prior to the enactment of the General Allotment Act or the Indian Tucker Act, 
courts had long acknowledged the trust relationship between the federal 
government and Native Americans. The government’s political goals prompted 
the Supreme Court to recognize a trust relationship between the federal 
government and Native Americans in 1831.128 The Court in Mitchell II extended 
this line of jurisprudence, stating that “the distinctive obligation of trust 
incumbent upon the Government in its dealings with these dependent and 
sometimes exploited people” created a special trust relationship.129 Furthermore, 
the Court held that where such a common law trust relationship is present, and 
where the government is given control over resources held in trust, a fiduciary 
126. Id. at 1111.
127. The unreported decision of Berry v. United States, No. C-94-0796-DLJ, 1994 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 9665 (N.D. Cal. July 1, 1994), held that the plaintiff could not rely on the Tucker Act and 
the Freedmen’s Bureau legislation for jurisdiction because the claim exceeded $10,000 (and so 
jurisdiction was exclusive to the Court of Claims) and because the court construed “any Act of 
Congress” to exclude expired legislation such as the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill. The latter 
conclusion, which is unsupported and unexplained, runs contrary to the general rule that the 
expiration of a statute does not extinguish liability incurred under that statute while still 
operational. See 1 U.S.C. § 109 (2012). 
128. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
129. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983) (quoting Seminole
Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 296 (1942)). 
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duty automatically arises.130 Trustee liability is a natural consequence of breach 
of these fiduciary duties.131 Cobell v. Norton similarly stated that the presence of 
a common law trust gives rise to fiduciary duties.132 The court also noted the 
presumption that money held for Native Americans by the United States is held 
in trust.133 
As discussed in Part III, the proposition that there are no similarities 
between African Americans and Native Americans ignores the similar 
approaches taken by the United States government to exercise domination and 
control over both groups to build this nation.134 It is precisely that treatment 
which gives rise to legally cognizable fiduciary duties. The absence of specific 
statutes or regulations is the essence of the common law. As a result, the 
perception that Cato is a fatal blow to African Americans’ attempts to secure 
monetary damages from the federal government is premature. Such views fail to 
explore the applicability of common law trust jurisprudence as a legal avenue to 
recompensing the inequitable African American experience in the United States. 
II. 
COMMON LAW TRUST JURISPRUDENCE 
The legal mechanism known as a trust is a well-established staple of the 
Anglo-American legal system.135 As described by the Restatement of Trusts, a 
trust is “a method of disposing of property and of enabling the transferor to 
provide flexibly for varied purposes and for a number of beneficiaries, often in 
sequence over time and often including persons yet to be born.”136 The law of 
trusts provides legally enforceable rights to beneficiaries who previously had 
only mere equitable interests.137 
130. Id. (“[A] fiduciary relationship necessarily arises when the Government assumes such
elaborate control over forests and property belonging to Indians.”). 
131. Id. at 226 (noting that a trust relationship “includes as a fundamental incident the right
of an injured beneficiary to sue the trustee for damages resulting from a breach of the trust”). 
Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 100 (2003).  
132. 240 F.3d 1081, 1101–02 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
133. Id. at 1098.
134. See ANTHONY S. PARENT, FOUL MEANS: THE FORMATION OF A SLAVE SOCIETY IN 
VIRGINIA, 1660–1740, at 9–25 (2003) (contextualizing the seizure of Native American land as a 
necessary precondition to the formation of a slave society in Virginia); Anthony Peirson Xavier 
Bothwell, We Live on Their Land: Implications of Long-Ago Takings of Native American Indian 
Property, 6 ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 175, 176–77 (2000) (discussing the forceful dislocation 
of Native Americans).  
135. See generally RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS (2003) (providing a summary of the
common law related to trusts through a discussion of general principles, comments, and 
illustrations). 
136. Id. at 4 (emphasis added).
137. See id. at 3–4.
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A. Legal Structure of the Trust Relationship
Under the common law, trusts are created when three elements are present: 
the trust corpus (also referred to as trust property), trustee, and beneficiary.138 
The trust corpus is to be held for the benefit and equitable interests of the 
beneficiaries.139 The trustee, who holds the property in trust, is under a fiduciary 
duty to act in the interest of the beneficiaries.140 Acting in the interest of the 
beneficiaries is the minimum standard of fiduciary duty to which a trustee must 
comply.141 Trustees generally have a fiduciary obligation to not profit at the 
beneficiaries’ expense.142 Additional fiduciary duties can and do arise depending 
upon the nature and details of various trusts. The beneficiary can be a class of 
one or more persons to whom the trustee owes said duties.143 It is important to 
recognize that a trust may be created even though the class of beneficiaries has 
yet to be identified.144 Likewise, the trust is not destroyed if the position of the 
trustee is temporarily vacant.145 Further, even if the trust corpus ceases to exist, 
any legal claim by, or on behalf of, the beneficiaries against the trustee 
constitutes trust property.146 As a result, the right to damages under the common 
law of trusts yields from the breach of duties, not the continued or current 
existence of the trust property. 
The Native American trust cases discussed in Part II.C illustrate that when 
the government exercises elaborate control over the resources and money of 
another, a common law trust relationship arises. Many of those decisions 
emphasize the historical context of the relationship between the government and 
indigenous Americans. The historical relationship between African Americans 
and the United States lends itself to a similar analysis. 
B. The Native Americans’ Common Law Trust Relationship
Sovereign immunity is only a barrier to reparations suits seeking monetary 
recompense from federal or state governments. Federal courts have generally 
held that they lack jurisdiction over reparations cases because the government 
has not consented to be sued in that context.147 Because Congress has failed to 
enact legislation similar to the Civil Liberties Act of 1988, the American judicial 
system has refused to redress the injustices suffered by African Americans. 
138. See id. § 2 cmt. f.
139. See id.
140. See id.
141. See id. § 2 cmt. b.
142. See id.
143. See id. § 2.
144. See id. § 2 cmt. h (internal citation omitted).
145. See id. § 2 cmt. g.
146. See id. § 2 cmt. i.
147. See, e.g., Cato v. United States, 70 F.3d 1103, 1107 (9th Cir. 1995); Johnson v.
McAdoo, 45 App. D.C. 440, 441 (1916), aff’d, 244 U.S. 643 (1917). 
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However, when a common law trust relationship exists, the barrier of sovereign 
immunity is broken. 
Native Americans have brought suit against the United States in several 
different types of cases. The selected cases discussed herein all pertain to issues 
surrounding American misuse and abuse of Native American land, money, and 
resources.148 The background of these cases involves the historical reality that 
Native Americans originally occupied the land upon which the Portuguese, 
Dutch, and English came to dominate.149 Once here, the foreign nationals 
methodically pushed the Native Americans off their lands.150 Eventually, the 
American government entered into treaties, common law trust relationships, 
and/or formal trusts with certain Native American nations,151 leaving them 
confined to reservations with little control over their resources.152 To achieve its 
goal of asserting domination over the land and physical resources occupied by 
Native Americans, the U.S. has gone to extraordinary lengths to “monopoliz[e] 
. . . control over the process of acquiring and redistributing tribal territory.”153 
These acquisitions have occurred largely without tribal consent or authority.154 
The enactment of laws such as the General Allotment Act has served to 
continually erode Native American property rights and resources.155 This 
enormous loss is evidenced by the staggering decrease in tribally-owned land, 
from 156 million acres in 1881 to approximately forty-eight million acres by 
1934.156 During this mass confiscation, American courts were content to assume 
a paternalistic role in the negotiation and transfer of tribal land.157 
Similar to Africans and their descendants, Native Americans were exploited 
and forced into subservient existences by the United States.158 Litigation 
148. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux Nation, 448 U.S. 371 (1980) (seeking compensation for
taking of land); United States v. Shoshone Tribe, 304 U.S. 111 (1938) (same). 
149. See Bothwell, supra note 134, at 176 (discussing the displacement of Native Americans
by European colonizers). 
150. Id.
151. See id. at 179–81.
152. See id. at 202–03.
153. Richard Monette, Governing Private Property in Indian Country: The Double-Edged
Sword of the Trust Relationship and Trust Responsibility Arising Out of Early Supreme Court 
Opinions and the General Allotment Act, 25 N.M. L. REV. 35, 46 (1995). 
154. See id. at 39–40.
155. See id. at 40.
156. Id. at 41.
157. See id. at 42–43.
158. As many scholars have pointed out, there are important differences between African
Americans and Native Americans. Some of these differences include the fact that Native American 
tribes are recognized as sovereign nations, while there is no sovereign African American nation. 
Additionally, Native Americans have the benefits of treaties and explicit contract agreements with 
the United States. The U.S.–Native American relationship has been likened to a relationship 
between two separate nations, while the African American relationship with the United States is 
one of a nation and its citizens. See BORIS I. BITTKER, THE CASE FOR BLACK REPARATIONS 73–78 
(1973); Graham Hughes, Reparations for Blacks?, 43 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1063, 1063–64 (1968) 
(discussing the historical similarities and differences between Native Americans and African 
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between Native Americans and the United States reaches back to the 
establishment of early American courts.159 It is well settled that a common law 
trust relationship exists between the United States and the indigenous American 
nations.160 As discussed in greater detail below, the judicial branch of the United 
States government has used this common law trust relationship as a basis to find 
that the government owes certain fiduciary duties due to its control over Native 
American resources. Although the extent of those duties varies largely on a case 
by case basis, the United States government has been routinely found to be a 
trustee for the benefit of Native Americans. For some time, case law clearly held 
the government owed fiduciary duties as it related to its dealings with Native 
Americans and their resources. Though Mitchell I and related cases assert that 
monetary damages cannot be obtained absent a specific statute, there is a line of 
jurisprudence that supports the opposite proposition, that the duties of trust owed 
by the federal government to Native Americans are legally enforceable without 
need of a statute, treaty, or agreement.161 The principle suggested by these cases 
is that, within the trust relationship, the federal government and its executive 
officials are not permitted to act in an adverse manner toward Native American 
trust property.162 The following subpart explores four cases to chronicle the 
progression of jurisprudence regarding the intersection of sovereign immunity 
waivers and fiduciary duties and to analogize the highlighted cases to our 
government’s relationship with African Americans. 
C. Important Common Law Trust Case Law
1. Mitchell I
In United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell I) the 1,465 members of the Quinault
Tribe, together with the Quinault Allottees Association, sued the United States 
Secretary of the Interior.163 The suit alleged government mismanagement of 
timber resources located on the reservation.164 According to plaintiffs, this 
mismanagement constituted a breach of the fiduciary duties owed to the Quinault 
Americans); Vincene Verdun, If the Shoe Fits, Wear It: An Analysis of Reparations to African-
Americans, 67 TUL. L. REV. 597, 648 (discussing differences between Native Americans and 
African Americans).  
159. See, e.g., Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831).
160. See United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 225 (1983); Cobell v. Norton,
240 F.3d 1081, 1098 (D.C. Cir. 2001). 
161. See Reid Payton Chambers, Judicial Enforcement of the Federal Trust Responsibility to
Indians, 27 STAN L. REV. 1213, 1230–32 (1975) (citing United States v. Creek Nation, 295 U.S. 
103 (1935); Cramer v. United States, 261 U.S. 219 (1923); and Lane v. Pueblo of Santa Rosa, 249 
U.S. 110 (1919) as Supreme Court cases that limit federal action with regard to Native American 
land based on the government’s fiduciary obligations). 
162. Id. at 1234.
163. 445 U.S. 535, 537 (1980).
164. Id. The reservation was created in 1873 by executive order. Id. at 536. The General
Allotment Act of 1877 authorized the government to disburse allotted land to individual Native 
Americans, and the majority of the Quinault land was disbursed by 1935. Id. 
HARDAWAY_11.12.15_FINAL_AN.DOCX (DO NOT DELETE) 11/15/15  2:38 PM 
2015] A SUBSTANTIVE RIGHT TO REPARATIONS 545 
Tribe by the government. Among other things, the suit claimed that the 
government failed to obtain a fair market value for the timber they sold off the 
land; failed to get payment for some of the sold timber; did not pay, or in some 
cases paid inadequately, interest on monies obtained as payment for the timber; 
and took excessive administrative fees.165 The case was appealed to the Supreme 
Court after the Court of Claims held that the General Allotment Act (“GAA”) 
placed a fiduciary duty upon the United States to manage the timber resources 
properly.166 
The Court of Claims also found that by enacting the General Allotment Act, 
the government waived any claims of sovereign immunity.167 The GAA 
permitted the President to allot a specific amount of agricultural and grazing land 
to every Native American living on a reservation.168 Importantly, the Act stated 
that the U.S. government was to hold the allotted land in trust for the individual 
allottees.169 The Act, in essence, allowed the government to have a great degree 
of control over the land despite giving it to the tribal members. The Supreme 
Court granted certiorari to resolve whether the GAA authorized plaintiffs to 
receive monetary damages from the United States if allegations of 
mismanagement of allotted forested lands proved to be true. In its opinion, the 
Supreme Court found fault with the ruling from the Federal Court of Claims. 
The Supreme Court held that the Mitchell I plaintiffs could not maintain a 
suit against the government based on the GAA and Indian Tucker Act.170 The 
Court began by stating that “[i]t is elementary that ‘[t]he United States, as 
sovereign, is immune from suit save as it consents to be sued’ . . . . In the 
absence of clear congressional consent, then, ‘there is no jurisdiction in the 
Court of Claims more than in any other court to entertain suits against the United 
States.’”171 The Court reasoned that the Tucker Act is merely jurisdictional and 
does not give claimants a substantive right to bring suit.172 Thus, according to 
the Court, the plaintiffs would need to locate a separate, substantive right to 
serve as a basis for a waiver of sovereign immunity. 
Next, the Court concluded that the GAA could not provide the requisite 
substantive right.173 Although section 5 of the GAA expressly mandated that the 
land be kept by the United States “in trust” for the allottees,174 the Court referred 
to the legislative history to conclude that the legislative intent of the Act was to 
165. Id. at 537.
166. Id. at 541.
167. Id. at 541.
168. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 1934).
169. Id. § 5.
170. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 546.
171. Id. at 538 (quoting United States v. Sherwood, 312 U.S. 584, 586 (1941)).
172. Id. at 538.
173. Id. at 542.
174. General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 1934).
HARDAWAY_11.12.15_FINAL_AN.DOCX	  (DO	  NOT	  DELETE)	   11/15/15	  	  2:38	  PM	  
546 N.Y.U. REVIEW OF LAW & SOCIAL CHANGE [Vol. 39:525 
create a limited trust relationship that did not impose any of the fiduciary duties 
the plaintiffs alleged had been breached.175 
To support this limited trust construction, the Court pointed to the language 
of the GAA in sections 1 and 2.176 The Court stated that “these sections indicate 
that the Indian allottee, and not a representative of the United States, is 
responsible for using the land for agricultural or grazing purposes.”177 However, 
this author would suggest that such use is not contrary to any ordinary trust 
relationship. Consider the minor child whose deceased parent leaves a trust for 
his or her benefit. The child is authorized to use the trust corpus (those things 
held in trust) for his or her benefit, just as the Native Americans were able to use 
the land for crops and to nourish farm animals. There is a trustee for the trust of 
the minor child even if the child is living in the home held in trust, just as the 
government was a trustee of the land that the Native Americans were allowed to 
use. Should the trustee in the case of the minor child fail to pay the utilities or 
home owner’s insurance for the child’s residence, the trustee would certainly be 
open to liability. The Supreme Court contradicted essential common law trust 
elements by stretching the statutory language and history to support an 
unnaturally limited trust relationship. The Court suggested that the express “in 
trust” language was simply intended to protect the allotments from state taxation 
and prevent alienation.178 
Ultimately, the Court held that “[a]ny right of the respondents to recover 
money damages for Government mismanagement of timber resources must be 
found in some source other than [the General Allotment] Act.”179 According to 
Mitchell I, the Tucker Act only satisfies the jurisdictional requirement and was 
not an explicit waiver of sovereign immunity. 
2. Mitchell II
United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II)180 involved an appeal from the Court
of Claims’ decision on remand from Mitchell I. This time, the Quinault Tribe 
prevailed in their suit for monetary damages against the United States. The key 
difference between the two cases was the statutes and regulations that the 
Quinault Tribe members used as the basis for their claim.181 
175. Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 542–44.
176. Id. at 542–43.
177. Id.
178. Id. at 543–44. As the dissent pointed out, “[t]he Act could hardly be more explicit” that
it created a trust relationship, and its language would undeniably be sufficient to create a trust by 
any settlor other than the United States. Id. at 547–48 (White, J., dissenting). 
179. Id. at 546.
180. 463 U.S. 206 (1983).
181. See Mitchell I, 445 U.S. at 551 n.7 (suggesting that, when the Court of Claims hears the
case on remand, it could find that monetary damages are appropriate under the Tucker Act on an 
alternative ground or under another statute).  
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On remand, the Court of Claims once again found that the tribal members 
were entitled to monetary damages, based on numerous statutes involving Native 
Americans, their resources, and their land.182 The Court of Claims found that 
these statutes implicitly imposed fiduciary duties on the government and thus 
made it liable for breach of those duties. The Supreme Court granted certiorari, 
noting the large amount of damages at stake, and affirmed.183 
The Court made several holdings while affirming the Court of Claims’ 
ruling that the government was liable for its breach of fiduciary duties. First, the 
Court clarified its previous ambiguity concerning the Tucker Act, unequivocally 
holding that by giving the Court of Claims jurisdiction over certain claims 
against the United States, Congress had waived sovereign immunity for those 
claims.184 To support the conclusion that consent to be sued was the purpose of 
the Tucker Act, the Court discussed the origins of the Act and identified the 
bill’s purpose as “giv[ing] the people of the United States what every civilized 
nation of the world has already done—the right to go into courts to seek redress 
against the Government for their grievances.”185 The enactment itself declared 
that it “provide[d] for the bringing of suits against the United States.”186 Finally, 
the Court pointed out that the unambiguous purpose of the Act was supported by 
at least two recent cases and that the Act had been construed to allow suit against 
the United States for decades.187 Therefore, if the basis of a suit is within the 
scope of the Tucker Act, then it is presumed that the United States has consented 
to the suit. 
The Court then compared the Indian Tucker Act to the Tucker Act and 
found that it had a similar history and purpose.188 It logically follows that by 
granting the Court of Claims jurisdiction over claims by Indian nations against 
the government, Congress waived sovereign immunity for those claims in the 
same way as with the Tucker Act. The Court disclaimed the dicta found in 
Mitchell I and other cases that suggested the Tucker Act was not a waiver of 
sovereign immunity, although it insisted that the results in those cases did not 
depend upon the sovereign immunity analysis and so were not now open to 
question.189  
182. See Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 211 (relying on 25 U.S.C. §§ 406, 407, 466, 318, 323, 324,
325, 162a, 413 (2012)). 
183. Id. at 211 & n.7 (“Because the decision of the Court of Claims raises issues of
substantial importance concerning the liability of the United States, we granted the Government’s 
petition for certiorari.”). 
184. Id. at 212.
185. Id. at 213–14 (quoting 18 CONG. REC. 2680 (1887) (statement of Rep. Bayne)).
186. Act of Mar. 3, 1887, ch. 359, 24 Stat. 505.
187. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 215 (citing Army & Air Force Exch. Serv. v. Sheehan, 456 U.S.
728, 734 (1982); Hatzlachh Supply Co. v. United States, 444 U.S. 460, 466 (1980)). 
188. Id. at 214–15 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1505 (2012)).
189. Id. at 216. Given this major shift between Mitchell I and Mitchell II, it is interesting to
note that Justice Marshall wrote both majority opinions. 
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Having definitively established a waiver of sovereign immunity that was 
open to the plaintiffs, the Court next tackled the issue of when a substantive right 
exists to obtain monetary damages against the United States. This, the Court 
said, is not provided by the Tucker Act.190 Instead, the Tucker Act stipulates that 
the right to sue must come from “the Constitution, or any Act of Congress or any 
regulation of any executive department.”191 In addition, the claimant must prove 
that the source of law being relied upon “can be fairly interpreted as mandating 
compensation by the Federal Government for the damages sustained.”192 While 
there was no specific language within the statutes and regulations relied upon in 
Mitchell II that authorized a substantive right to money damages, the Court 
looked to the purpose of those laws.193 The Court concluded that the statutes and 
regulations here imposed on the government “full responsibility to manage 
Indian resources and land for the benefit of the Indians” and accordingly 
“establish[ed] a fiduciary relationship.”194 
The Court in Mitchell II also used strong and persuasive language to 
describe the origin of the fiduciary relationship between the government and 
Native Americans. Aside from the language of the statute and regulations, the 
Court found that a fiduciary relationship “necessarily arises when the 
Government assumes such elaborate control” over the property and monies of 
Native Americans.195 The Court observed that under such an arrangement, “[a]ll 
of the necessary elements of a common-law trust are present: a trustee (the 
United States), a beneficiary ([the group with ownership rights to the property 
and/or money being held, in this case Native Americans]), and a trust corpus 
([the property and/or money]).”196 The Court explained that: 
“[W]here the Federal Government takes on or has control or 
supervision over tribal monies or properties, the fiduciary 
relationship normally exists with respect to such monies or 
properties (unless Congress has provided otherwise) even 
though nothing is said expressly in the authorizing or underlying 
statute (or other fundamental document) about a trust fund, or a 
trust or fiduciary connection.”197 
According to the Mitchell II Court, the Tucker Act is indeed a waiver of 
sovereign immunity. The waiver only gives proper plaintiffs the right to sue the 
190. Id.
191. 28 U.S.C. § 1491 (2012).
192. Mitchell II, 463 U.S. at 216–17 (quoting United States v. Testan, 424 U.S. 392, 400
(1976)). 
193. Id. at 219–23 (discussing the government’s control over Indian timber and rights-of-
way). 
194. Id. at 224.
195. Id. at 225.
196. Id.
197. Id. (emphasis added) (quoting Navajo Tribe of Indians v. United States, 624 F.2d 981,
987 (Ct. Cl. 1980)). 
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federal government; plaintiffs must also have a substantive right to obtain money 
damages from the government. But that right need not be explicit; in the case of 
Native Americans, the Court found a right to money damages arising out of laws 
and regulations that did not expressly provide for such. While Mitchell II used 
statutes as support for finding the government liable to the Quinault Tribe, there 
is dicta concerning the existence of a fiduciary duty even outside of those 
statutes. The Court’s opinion, expressly identifying the elements of a common 
law trust relationship, indicated that elaborate control by the government over 
the land, forest, and property belonging to another establishes a fiduciary 
relationship, even if the control arises outside the context of legislation. 
3. Cobell v. Norton
The D.C. Circuit’s 2001 decision in Cobell v. Norton198 provided an
insightful and comprehensive summary of multiple phases of the government’s 
“elaborate control” over indigenous lands and Native Americans. The 
government’s control over the land at issue in Cobell began over a hundred years 
prior to the filing of the case.199 The funds at issue were generated from the 
lands held in trust that were to be managed by the government for the benefit of 
account holders in Individual Indian Money (“IIM”) accounts.200 
Plaintiffs, the beneficiaries of IIM accounts, filed a class action suit alleging 
that the Department of the Interior breached its fiduciary duties pertaining to the 
accounts.201 Plaintiffs alleged, among other things, that the government failed to 
provide proper accounting of each IIM. Plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment 
outlining the government’s trust responsibilities and injunctive relief 
guaranteeing those responsibilities would be met.202 The government admitted 
its failure to keep proper and accurate accounting of the number of IIM accounts 
and their balances.203 Nevertheless, and in the face of an extensive network of 
statutes and regulations regarding the IIM and related federal oversight, the 
government asserted sovereign immunity during the district court 
proceedings.204 The district court held, and the court of appeals affirmed, that 
jurisdiction was proper and sovereign immunity was waived under the 
Administrative Procedure Act for non-monetary relief.205 
198. 240 F.3d 1081 (D.C. Cir. 2001). This action was settled in 2011 for $3.4 billion. Cobell
v. Salazar, 679 F.3d 909, 916 (D.C. Cir. 2012). Reportedly, this was the largest settlement ever
reached with the U.S. government. Dennis M. Gingold & M. Alexander Pearl, Tribute to Elouise
Cobell, 33 PUB. LAND & RESOURCES L. REV. 189, 192 (2012).
199. Cobell, 240 F.3d at 1086.
200. Id. at 1087.
201. Id. at 1092–93.
202. Id. at 1086.
203. Id. at 1089.
204. Id. at 1093.
205. Id. at 1093–94.
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The court of appeals made it clear that, even without a statute establishing a 
trust, the relationship between the federal government and Native Americans 
gives rise to a definite fiduciary duty when the government controls tribal 
monies or property.206 Citing Mitchell II, the court found that when certain 
elements exist, a fiduciary duty arises.207 The court noted that, absent explicit 
language to the contrary, there is a presumption that money held by the United 
States for Native American nations is held in trust.208 The basis and rationale for 
the presumption rests in the elaborate control the United States has over the 
property. Thus, this ruling provides precedent for courts to find the existence of a 
trust relationship even when such a relationship is not explicitly stated in a 
federal regulation or statute.209 Moreover, government trust obligations are 
defined by the court in traditional terms of equity.210 The court stated that while 
the relationship giving rise to a common law trust must be rooted in some 
legislation or executive action, the duties arising from the trust relationship need 
not be explicitly stated and may be implied from the nature of the relationship 
itself.211 Therefore, it is presumed that when money belonging to Native 
Americans is being held by the government, courts should find that a trust 
relationship exists between the parties.212 
At the outset of its analysis, the court established that the substantial trust 
responsibilities the United States owes Native Americans are a result of the 
“elaborate control” the government has exerted over their property.213 The court 
then discussed the “contentious and tragic” relationship resulting from the 
violent expansionism of the United States.214 These ambitions led the 
government to take the land and property of Native Americans—at times with 
the use of treaties, but, as the court acknowledged, also by force.215 Furthermore, 
the court stated that there existed within the government an “[u]nofficial policy 
[that] encouraged the forcible dislocation of Indian tribes.”216 This analysis is 
consistent with the historical development of Native American law. The Anglo-
American concept of trust law was introduced early during the development of 
our nation. To this end, the Supreme Court equated the government’s 
relationship to Native Americans with that of a guardian and a ward in 1831.217 
That characterization of the relationship was useful to the United States for the 




210. Id. at 1099.
211. Id.
212. Id. at 1098.
213. Id. at 1086.
214. Id.
215. Id.
216. Id. at 1087.
217. See Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 17 (1831).
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purposes of achieving its desired goals at that specific time.218 The necessary 
consequence of that long history of control is that the federal government be held 
accountable for the theft and mismanagement of Native American land and 
resources. 
4. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe
The judicial analysis of the United States–Native American trust
relationship continued in 2003 with the Supreme Court’s decision concerning 
land held in trust for the White Mountain Apache Tribe.219 Through 
Congressional legislation enacted in 1960, Fort Apache—along with its prior 
improvements—was proclaimed to “be held by the United States in trust for the 
White Mountain Apache Tribe.”220 A portion of the land that comprised the Fort 
was used as a Native American boarding school.221 The Department of the 
Interior was entitled to “use any part of the land and improvements for 
administrative or school purposes.”222 Over time, the United States allowed the 
property and the buildings contained thereon to fall into disrepair, and many of 
the buildings on the property were condemned and demolished by the 
Department of Interior.223 
The Court asked whether the 1960 legislation, holding the Fort Apache land 
in trust, gave the Court of Federal Claims jurisdiction over a claim for money 
damages under the Indian Tucker Act.224 After swiftly reaffirming that the 
Tucker Act (and its companion legislation, the Indian Tucker Act) provided the 
requisite waiver of sovereign immunity to support jurisdiction in the Federal 
Court of Claims,225 the Court reiterated that neither the Tucker Act nor the 
Indian Tucker Act conferred a substantive right to plaintiffs for monetary 
damages.226 
In finding that the United States had a duty to preserve and repair the 
occupied buildings, the Court noted that the government had exercised its right 
to use and occupy the land and so “obtained control at least as plenary as its 
218. See, e.g., Chambers, supra note 161, at 1218–19 (discussing the United States’
assumption of the guardian role while subjugating Native Americans to the role of wards so as to 
further the government’s goals of maintaining Native American property ownership within the 
“system of American land tenure”). 
219. United States v. White Mountain Apache Tribe, 537 U.S. 465 (2003). The property at
issue, Fort Apache, was established by the United States Army in 1870 and used as a military base 
until 1922, when control of the property was transferred to the United States Secretary of the 
Interior. Id. at 468. 
220. Act of March 18, 1960, Pub. L. No. 86-392, 74 Stat. 8.
221. White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 468.
222. White Mountain Apache Tribe v. United States, 249 F.3d 1364, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2001),
aff’d, 537 U.S. 465. 
223. Id.
224. White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 471.
225. Id. at 472.
226. Id. at 472.
E
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authority over the timber in Mitchell II.”227 The Court recognized that “one of 
the fundamental common law duties of a trustee is to preserve and maintain trust 
assets” and “elementary trust law . . . confirms the commonsense assumption 
that a fiduciary actually administering trust property may not allow it to fall into 
ruin on his watch.”228 Of great importance is the Court’s recognition that when 
the government owes a fiduciary duty, “[i]t naturally follows that the 
Government should be liable in damages for the breach of its fiduciary 
duties.”229 
The previously highlighted Native American cases support the argument for 
African American reparations. This support rests in the United States Supreme 
Court and federal court holdings that acknowledge a common law trust 
relationship as a legal theory of recovery from the government. That 
relationship, and its concomitant fiduciary duties, is formed when elaborate 
control is exerted over the property and assets of a people. As detailed below, the 
control exerted over the lives and property of African Americans during and 
after the Civil War created a similar trust relationship with the federal 
government. 
III.  
AFRICAN AMERICANS’ COMMON LAW TRUST RELATIONSHIP WITH THE 
FEDERAL GOVERNMENT 
A. Origins
The common law trust relationship between the United States government 
and African Americans began in January 1863. At that time General Nathaniel 
Banks, under the authority of the United States government during its occupation 
of Louisiana, instituted a “compulsory system of free labor.”230 That system 
required some 50,000 African Americans in Louisiana to work on 1,500 
plantation estates as employees working for the federal government or “for 
individual planters under contracts supervised by the army.”231 Conditions of 
employment required that the laborers sign yearly contracts, avoid “vagrancy,” 
and obtain permission to leave the plantations from their respective 
employers.232 The system provided the laborer with an extremely low wage that, 
when considered along with the other conditions of employment, amounted to 
227. Id. at 475.
228. Id. Accord RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 76 (2003) (noting the trustee’s duty to
“protect[]” trust property). 
229. White Mountain, 537 U.S. at 476 (quoting United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463
U.S. 206, 226 (1983)). 
230. ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED REVOLUTION 1863–1877, at 55–
56 (1988). 
231. Id. at 56.
232. Id. at 55.
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little more than slave labor.233 The government expanded the compulsory system 
of free labor into the entire Mississippi Valley and compelled the labor of more 
than 700,000 African Americans.234 But compelling labor was merely a by-
product of the government’s overarching goal “to take charge of the 
contrabands.”235 Plantations were leased to Northern investors, who stood to 
turn a quick profit while often denying the African American laborers under their 
employ even the meager wages to which they were entitled.236 Although the 
Treasury Department mandated wage increases during a brief period when it 
took control of the Mississippi Valley system, President Lincoln soon returned 
control to the military, which slashed wages—even for laborers who had signed 
contracts guaranteeing higher rates.237 The government, through its military 
force, specifically controlled and benefitted from the labor of African Americans 
without providing equitable compensation. 
By September of 1863, President Abraham Lincoln instructed the 
commissioners of the American Freedmen’s Inquiry Commission238 to make 
confiscated lands available for purchase in twenty-acre plots to African 
American households “so as to give them an interest in the soil.”239 It was clear 
during this time that the federal government was actively involved in creating 
property interests for the former slaves. 
With the Civil War nearing its end, Secretary of War Edwin M. Stanton and 
General William T. Sherman met with African American community leaders in 
Savannah, Georgia, on January 12, 1865, to discuss the confiscated Confederate 
lands.240 Following this meeting, the General issued Special Field Order No. 15 
and ordered the division of plantations on the Atlantic coast into forty-acre plots 
for the use of freed slaves.241 Within six months, the order had provided land to 
40,000 African Americans.242 In the words of Bureau Commissioner Howard, 
the purpose of Sherman’s Order was to “give the freedmen protection, land and 
233. See id. (describing how laborers were paid either five percent of the annual crop
proceeds or three dollars per month, plus food, shelter, and medical care). 
234. Id. at 56–57.
235. Id. at 57.
236. Id. at 57–58.
237. Id. at 58.
238. See FONER, supra note 230, at 68; PAUL A. CIMBALA, THE FREEDMEN’S BUREAU:
RECONSTRUCTING THE AMERICAN SOUTH AFTER THE CIVIL WAR 7 (2005). 
239. Verdun, supra note 158, at 601 n.7. This directive from President Lincoln followed two
prior pieces of legislation. The first, the Act of August 6, 1861, authorized the confiscation of 
property from landowners engaged in insurrection. See Act of Aug. 8, 1861, ch. 60, 12 Stat. 319. 
The second piece of legislation authorizing confiscation of property was signed on July 17, 1862. 
See Act of July 16, 1862, ch. 190, 12 Stat. 589. Thereafter, on February 10, 1863, Lincoln created 
a commission of five men to decide if the land should be used for police, charitable, or educational 
purposes. Verdun, supra, at 601 n.7.  
240. FONER, supra note 230, at 70.
241. Id. at 70–71. Sherman later expanded the order to instruct the army to loan mules to
African Americans. Id. 
242. Id. at 71.
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schools, as far and as fast” as possible.243 Though Sherman would later say that 
the land grants were to be temporary, the Order itself promised “possessory 
title[s],”244 and the officer implementing the Order told the recipient freedmen 
that the land was theirs.245 African Americans on the “Sherman Reservation” 
cultivated the land under government supervision and were shocked when the 
government reversed course on the land grants.246 
Governmental control over the labor and livelihood of African Americans 
recently freed from the bondage of slavery gained legislative authority with the 
creation of the Bureau of Refugees, Freedmen, and Abandoned Lands.247 The 
Act establishing the Bureau authorized the government, through the actions of a 
Commissioner appointed by the President, to control all “subjects relating to 
refugees and freedmen from rebel states.”248 The legislation represented the 
federal government’s effort to codify the means by which it would protect the 
more than half a million former slaves for which it had assumed a duty to 
care.249 To do so, the Act provided that the government, through the Department 
of War, would supervise and manage the confiscated or purchased land in the 
South for the purpose of renting said property to every newly freed male 
citizen.250 The land distribution plan was created to serve two main purposes: 
(1) to provide the newly freed African Americans resources “where by faithful
industry they can achieve independence” and (2) to provide what was owed to
the freedpersons for their “two hundred years of unrequited toil.”251 Though the
government had title to the property, the Act provided that the land would
subsequently be available for the freedmen to purchase in forty-acre parcels.252
The original purpose of this possessory conveyance was not lost on the African
Americans to whom the property was turned over. Freedpersons who were
allotted lands, and thousands more who anticipated allotments, understood the
land to be their inheritance following the Civil War.253
Officials operating under the authority of the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill 
controlled labor relations among African Americans, the government, and 
planters.254 Major General Oliver Otis Howard, the command leader of the 
243. FONER, supra note 230, at 159; see also General Sherman Enacts “Forty Acres and a
Mule,” AFR. AM. REGISTRY, http://www.aaregistry.org/historic_events/view/general-sherman
-enacts-forty-acres-and-mule (last visited Mar. 13, 2015).
244. Magee, supra note 1, at 888.
245. FONER, supra note 230, at 71.
246. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 55.
247. See Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507.
248. Id.
249. See CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 4 (describing how “over half a million” slaves “came
under the protection of the nation” by the end of the war). 
250. 13 Stat. at 508.
251. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 52.
252. See 13 Stat. 507.
253. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 52.
254. See FONER, supra note 230, at 164–65.
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Bureau in 1865, created a “practicable system of compensated labor” aimed at 
increasing the hire rate of African Americans.255 Strikingly similar to the duties 
of a trustee, Howard’s assistant commissioners were charged with “wisely, 
faithfully, conscientiously fearlessly” securing reasonable wages for the 
laborers.256 The wages for free men, women, and children were negotiated by, 
and enforced under the authority of, the Bureau.257 Nonetheless, efforts by 
Bureau officials to collect back wages owed to African American laborers were 
frequently unsuccessful.258 And though the Bureau was enacted for the benefit 
of freedpersons, the Bureau regularly required African Americans to sign labor 
contracts that were not in their best interests.259 
Of equal importance, the United States charged itself with protecting the life 
and liberty of its newly freed citizens.260 The Freedmen’s Bureau was charged 
with securing justice for African Americans and settling their grievances.261 The 
legislation further required that the Commissioner provide annual accountings 
and reports to the President who, in turn, would report to Congress.262 
B. The Breach
The promises of the Freedmen’s Bureau were the first and last explicit effort 
by the United States government to redistribute at least some portion of the 
nation’s ill-gained wealth.263 The government quickly breached its duties to 
provide property to, manage the affairs of, and protect the lives of newly freed 
African Americans. After the assassination of President Lincoln, and while the 
legislative purpose of the Freedmen’s Bureau Act was being carried out, 
President Andrew Johnson deliberately deviated from that purpose by changing 
Bureau personnel to individuals who were not committed to the legislative intent 
of the Bill.264 The government further breached its fiduciary duties when it 
255. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 11.
256. Id. Cf. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 2 cmt. b, f (2003).
257. See FONER, supra note 230, at 165–66.
258. See Magee, supra note 1, at 890.
259. FONER, supra note 230, at 166–67. Bureau agents would fine or imprison African
American laborers who did not accept the terms of the contracts negotiated for them, even though 
the contracts barely paid subsistence wages and required that the freedpersons commit to work for 
a year. Id. Although one Bureau official noted the high number of “houseless, homeless, poor 
wandering, idle white men in the South,” the government never required that these “idle white 
men” sign labor contracts or restricted where they were allowed to live and work. Id. at 167. The 
government’s coercion of African Americans to sign labor contracts was unique to their 
relationship.  
260. Cf. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507 (giving the Bureau “control of all subjects”
relating to freed slaves). 
261. See FONER, supra note 230, at 149 (describing the courts created by the Bureau to
adjudicate disputes between planters and freedpersons). 
262. See 13 Stat. 507.
263. Cf. BROPHY, supra note 12, at 30–32 (listing reparations efforts and proposals and the
total cost of those efforts). 
264. See CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 14–15.
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placed the political agenda of the day above that of the African American 
beneficiaries with whom the government had already commenced a common law 
trust relationship.265 
To curry political favor from Southern landowners, the executive branch 
removed over 400,000 acres from the purview of the Freedman’s Bureau and 
returned it to former Confederate landowners who had been pardoned during 
Reconstruction.266 Bureau Commissioner Howard believed, based on the 
representations of the United States Attorney General, that the presidential 
pardons of Confederate Southerners were never intended to affect the land that 
had previously been confiscated or abandoned.267 Commissioner Howard’s 
Circular No. 13, issued to freedpersons and Bureau personnel by the 
Commissioner, expressly communicated that the pardons were to have no effect 
on the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill.268 Under the active legislation, freedmen were 
owed a minimum of three more years of protection on the land.269 However, the 
wording of President Johnson’s order empowered the prior landowners to 
immediately evict African Americans lawfully occupying the land.270 Instead of 
being able to work and live on the allotted lands for the remaining three years, as 
provided by the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill, African Americans were once again 
forced into year-long labor contracts with their former owners.271 President 
Johnson also ordered United States attorneys not to begin any new land 
confiscation cases.272 
Not only did the government return land that had been confiscated and 
designated as available to African American laborers, the government removed 
African Americans from property on which they were then residing. In Virginia 
alone, almost 20,000 African American laborers were illegally evicted from 
property.273 A second Freedmen’s Bureau Bill was passed on July 16, 1866; 
however, it presented African Americans with three options starkly different 
from the outright promise of conveyance from the government to African 
Americans under the first Freedmen’s Bureau Bill and Sherman’s Field Order 
No. 15. Those who presented valid possessory titles could either remain on the 
265. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TRUSTS § 78 (2007) (discussing the duty of loyalty owed
to beneficiaries and the incontrovertible requirement that trustees avoid acting unfairly or in bad 
faith).  
266. BROOKS, ATONEMENT, supra note 4, at 7 (quoting Pigford v. Glickman, 185 F.R.D. 82,
85 (D.D.C. 1999)); CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 54. 
267. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 53–54.
268. Id.
269. Act of Mar. 3, 1865, ch. 90, 13 Stat. 507, 508 (providing that “the person to whom it
was so assigned shall be protected in the use and enjoyment of the land for the term of three 
years”). 
270. See FONER, supra note 230, at 159–60; Verdun, supra note 158, at 602 n.10.
271. FONER, supra note 230, at 164.
272. DONALD G. NIEMAN, PROMISES TO KEEP: AFRICAN-AMERICANS AND THE
CONSTITUTIONAL ORDER, 1776 TO THE PRESENT 60 (1991). 
273. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 54.
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land and sign labor contracts with the former landowners or purchase land on the 
coast of South Carolina from the government; those who did not meet the 
technical requirements to have their titles recognized were given no option but to 
leave the property they had cultivated and made home for at least the past year 
and a half to find work someplace else.274 A great majority of recently 
emancipated African Americans could not satisfy the new requirements 
unexpectedly thrust upon them. Not only was poverty a barrier, poor 
recordkeeping on the part of the government, or closed and inaccessible land 
offices, rendered access to surveys and maps impossible.275 The new land being 
offered as a substitute was often poor quality and uninhabitable.276 These factors 
were only compounded by the harsh reality that whites, regardless of land 
ownership status, were staunchly opposed to Black land ownership. The lack of 
intervention by the Bureau, created precisely to protect freedpersons, combined 
with fierce opposition from the white populace, forced African Americans back 
into a system of labor without compensation.277 
The government’s breach of duties is further evidenced by its failure to 
negotiate fair and reasonable wages for African American workers. The Bureau 
initially enforced payment agreements between laborers and planters.278 
However, by 1866, under the executive leadership of President Johnson, the 
Bureau was regularly failing to fulfill this duty.279 Where once the Bureau had 
enforced prompt payment, even placing liens on crops, over time contracts that 
withheld wages until the end of the year (so as to prevent laborers from leaving) 
became the norm.280 The Bureau’s duties under the Freedmen’s Bill were now 
usurped by the government’s desire to rebuild its economic base of Southern 
agriculture.281 The United States controlled African Americans during this time 
by ordering them to work and used military force to compel those who 
resisted.282 Military orders prohibited travel without passes, insubordination, 
idleness, and vagrancy.283 
Instead of negotiating fair wages for African Americans, the Bureau was 
more concerned with ingratiating the Johnson administration to white 
landowners by enforcing harsh labor discipline policies.284 To that end, African 
Americans were forced to sign contracts that favored the planters, as well as the 
government, and imposed requirements on the personal lives of African 
274. Id. at 56–57.
275. Id. at 61.
276. See id.
277. See FONER, supra note 230, at 165–67.
278. Id. at 165.
279. Magee, supra note 1, at 890.
280. FONER, supra note 230, at 166, 171.
281. Id. at 153.
282. Id. at 166.
283. Id. at 154.
284. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 15.
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Americans as a condition of receiving compensation.285 Labor contracts often 
contained forfeiture clauses that permitted employers, at their discretion, to 
determine when a worker’s conduct forfeited all wages—even those earned prior 
to the alleged misconduct.286 
The Bureau further breached its duties by hiring personnel such as Thomas 
Hunnicutt, a former plantation overseer and driver, who actively worked against 
the mission of the agency and the interests of its beneficiaries by forcing 
freedpersons into labor agreements and openly requiring sexual favors from 
freedwomen.287 The Bureau was keenly aware that the wages and conditions of 
employment they enforced were not sufficient to keep African American 
workers out of poverty, but the Bureau did nothing to secure proper wage 
increases.288 Indeed, Bureau agents were often perceived by white planters as 
“substitute[s] for overseers and drivers.”289 
It was during the Bureau’s tenure, and while it owed a duty to African 
Americans, that the “Black Codes” in Southern states were enacted.290 The 
Codes required that African Americans provide proof of employment and stable 
housing each January.291 Though the Bureau had a duty to secure justice and 
settle grievances of African Americans, personnel at the Bureau offices often 
included agents filled with racist animus and bias against the very individuals 
they were charged with serving.292 The Assistant Commissioners also failed to 
protect the rights of African Americans when military officers exacted physical 
punishment in retribution for the freedpersons violating one of the many Bureau 
orders.293 The government continued to breach its duty to protect the life and 
liberty of African Americans through its failure to prosecute the innumerable 
brutal assaults, rapes, and murders of African American men, women, and 
children that occurred between Reconstruction and the enactment of the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964.294 
C. Historical Similarities of Elaborate Domination and Control
The government used its control over African Americans, via its military 
and the Freedmen’s Bureau, to relocate African Americans to areas beneficial to 
285. FONER, supra note 230, at 166–67.
286. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 157–58.
287. Id. at 30; Randy Finley, The Personnel of the Freedmen’s Bureau in Arkansas, in THE
FREEDMEN’S BUREAU AND RECONSTRUCTION: RECONSIDERATIONS 93, 100 (Paul A. Cimbala & 
Randall M. Miller eds., 1999). 
288. FONER, supra note 230, at 166.
289. Id. at 168.
290. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 71.
291. Id.
292. See CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 30 (discussing Thomas Hunnicutt, a former overseer
who sexually abused freedwomen while working for the Bureau); Finley, supra note 287, at 100. 
293. CIMBALA, supra note 238, at 149.
294. Cf. FONER, supra note 230, at 148; FRANKLIN & MOSS, supra note 3, at 345–50, 514.
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the government and to force African Americans into labor contracts for the 
purpose of rebuilding the nation’s agricultural economic base post-Civil War.295 
Similarly, Native Americans were forced to relocate onto reservation lands so 
that America’s borders could expand.296 
Though there are undeniable differences between the historical experiences 
and nationality of Native Americans and African Americans,297 there are 
definite similarities in the government’s domination and control over both 
groups and their respective resources. When tasked with deciding reparation 
claims, courts have failed to acknowledge the compensable damages caused by 
the purposeful intentions of those who stole land from Native Americans and 
then used African and African American labor, during slavery and afterwards, to 
cultivate it.298 Most importantly, courts have failed to recognize their power and 
authority to provide relief based on existing laws. 
The government’s duties to Native Americans have been recognized and 
upheld by the Court in Mitchell II. These same duties can and should be applied 
to African Americans. The pattern and practice of stripping both groups of their 
resources and financial interest by the United States government merits 
remuneration. The United States secured its most valuable possession—
cultivated and profitable land—only through control and supervision over both 
Native Americans and African Americans and their resources. The government’s 
gain caused long-term harms that are widely evident today. Representative 
Howard, a co-sponsor of the 1934 Act referenced in Mitchell II, recognized that 
“[t]he failure of their governmental guardian to conserve the Indians’ land and 
assets and the consequent loss of income or earning power, has been the 
principal cause of the present plight of the average Indian.”299 The same was 
295. FONER, supra note 230, at 153–54 (describing how the army forced African American
laborers to work in order to achieve “[t]he aim of revitalizing the South’s production of 
agricultural staples”); id. at 164–65 (describing how Bureau agents forced African Americans to 
sign sharecropping contracts and relocated laborers). 
296. See General Allotment Act, ch. 119, § 1, 24 Stat. 388 (1887) (repealed 1934); Indian
Removal Act of 1830, ch. 148, 4 Stat. 411. The government’s control and domination of Native 
Americans proceeded in several phases. See Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086–87 (D.C. Cir. 
2001). The first phase involved the forcible dislocation of Native Americans as part of the nation’s 
expansionist objectives. Id. The Indian Removal Act of 1830 made the relocation of Native 
Americans official government policy by offering unsettled land to Native Americans in exchange 
for their settled and occupied land in the east. Id. During the latter half of the nineteenth century, 
the second phase, the government divided Native American land into parcels, removed it from 
tribal ownership, and redistributed it to individual Native Americans in order to “extinguish tribal 
sovereignty, erase reservation boundaries and force assimilation of Indians into society at large.” 
Id. (quoting Yakima v. Yakima Indian Nation, 502 U.S. 251, 254 (1992)). To that end, the 
enactment of the General Allotment Act in 1887 provided formal authorization of the 
government’s allotment and assimilation policies. During this phase, the United States took over 
ninety million acres of property, constituting around two-thirds of all Native American land, over 
the course of fewer than fifty years. Id. 
297. See supra note 158.
298. See PARENT, supra note 134, at 19–25, 55 (2003).
299. United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 221 (1983).
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true of the labor contracts that African Americans were forced into by the 
Freedmen’s Bureau under the authority of the federal government. One Bureau 
agent aptly observed that “[w]ith labor at fifteen dollars a month . . . it is one 
endless struggle to beat back poverty.”300 
These acknowledgements by Representative Howard and others are not new 
revelations. The government has repeatedly breached its fiduciary duties and 
advanced its own interests at the expense of struggling African Americans. This 
is evidenced by the government’s interaction with some slaves who owned 
property prior to the Emancipation Proclamation.301 An 1827 account of 
southern law revealed that “[b]ecause they were property, slaves could not 
legally own property. A slave could acquire and hold personal property but only 
by the consent of his master, who granted it as a favor.”302 Nonetheless, slaves 
obtained horses, cattle, land, and money as their own property.303 They found 
time and opportunity to farm and use their livestock for their own financial gain 
during times when they were not working for their masters.304 
While this account is relatively unknown and has the potential to re-shape 
our perspectives of African American history, the fact that slaves owned 
property is not itself the ultimate hinge of the argument for reparations. Instead, 
the critical issue is what Union soldiers did with the property of African 
Americans during and immediately after the Civil War. Accounts reveal the 
experiences of former slaves such as Pompey Bacon.305 Mr. Bacon and his 
family welcomed Union soldiers onto their land and into their homes for meals 
in 1864.306 He recalled being grateful to the soldiers as they fought for the 
freedom of slaves, his gratitude prompting him to clothe naked soldiers and feed 
those who had not eaten for days.307 However, Mr. Bacon’s kindness (and the 
kindness of others like him) was exploited and taken as a weakness. 
Without warning or explanation, hordes of Union soldiers raided his 
property and used his bed sheets and his wife’s underclothes to serve as sacks for 
hauling away Mr. Bacon’s corn.308 The soldiers shot his hogs and used his 
horses to take the meat with them.309 As Mr. Bacon and those around him 
protested about being left without anything to sustain them, one soldier replied, 
“We are obliged to, we come to set you free, & we must have something to eat, 
300. FONER, supra note 230, at 166.
301. See DYLAN C. PENNINGROTH, THE CLAIMS OF KINFOLK: AFRICAN AMERICAN PROPERTY
AND COMMUNITY IN THE NINETEENTH-CENTURY SOUTH, 45–109 (2003) (describing slave-owned 
property). 
302. Id. at 45 (internal citations omitted).
303. Id. at 47–49.
304. Id. at 47–52.
305. Id at 1–6.
306. Id. at 1–2.
307. Id. at 2.
308. Id.
309. Id.
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but you must go to ‘Uncle Sam.’ Uncle Sam’s pockets drag on the ground.”310 
Property-owning slaves who had the presence of mind to request a receipt for the 
items consumed by the soldiers were dismayed to have the receipts torn up in 
their face by another soldier.311 These newly freed slaves would have entered 
into freedom with their property intact but for the actions of these Union soldiers 
who took their property without compensation. They were told that this wrong 
could be righted by submitting claims to “Uncle Sam,” yet Uncle Sam has 
repeatedly refused to provide relief. Reparation payments are the only just 
compensation for this clear malfeasance by the American government. 
America’s failure to acknowledge and hold itself accountable for “the 
contemporary plight” of African Americans has not erased the past.312 The 
disproportionate inability of African Americans to afford housing, food, 
clothing, and education can undoubtedly be traced back to this denial of just 
compensation.313 
The elaborate control and “contentious and tragic relationship [with Native 
Americans caused by] America’s expansionist impulse”314 also describes the 
relationship between the United States and African Americans. While the 
government expelled Native Americans from their property, it simultaneously 
forced African Americans to develop and cultivate these properties. Just as the 
government codified its control over Native American resources via the General 
Allotment Act and the 1960 Act, it codified its control over African Americans 
and their affairs with the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill. That control has continued 
long after the expiration of the Bill. The government’s mismanagement of 
Native American land, timber, and money is comparable to its mismanagement 
of African American wages, labor, money, and land. Thus, the “elaborate control 
and domination” exercised by the government over African Americans and their 
resources has created a fiduciary relationship, the breach of which is properly 
compensated by monetary damages. Notwithstanding the distinctions between 
African Americans and Native Americans, there are compelling reasons to apply 
a similar presumption where the government has exerted control over the 
property of African Americans. 
IV. 
MAKING THE CASE FOR REPARATIONS 
As discussed above, in the common law trust relationship between the 
United States and African Americans, the government occupies the role of the 
trustee, while a class of African Americans constitutes the intended beneficiaries. 
That class is comprised of individuals of African descent who have direct 
310. Id.
311. Id.
312. See RANDALL ROBINSON, THE DEBT: WHAT AMERICA OWES TO BLACKS, 222–24 (2000).
313. See id. at 8–9.
314. Cobell v. Norton, 240 F.3d 1081, 1086 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
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evidence that one or more of their ancestors were enslaved in the United States 
prior to emancipation and alive during and after the Civil War.315 This evidence 
can be gathered through lineage searches, family trees, public records, or 
judicially authenticated writings from an ancestor.316 Once an individual has 
established that she is a descendant of those Africans or African Americans 
living in America during the relevant time period, all other persons living and 
related to that individual will also be members of the aggrieved class. The trust 
property consists of the lost wages and property of African Americans following 
the Thirteenth Amendment. The breach for which redress is required includes 
governmental commissions and omissions by the United States during and after 
the Civil War. 
A. The Tucker Act as a Waiver of Sovereign Immunity for Claims Arising Out of
Breach of a Trust Relationship 
It is clear that the majority of America’s judiciary believes its hands are tied 
on the subject of African American reparations. This tension has been 
unnecessarily caused by a self-servingly myopic legal analysis employed to 
analyze reparations claims. The historical relationship between the United States 
and African Americans is one in which the concerns and interests of African 
Americans have been ignored and exploited to benefit white America. Judicial 
decisions that have summarily dismissed African American claims have only 
served to reinforce the hierarchical nature of America’s institutionalized system 
of racism. The application of the Tucker Act to African American reparations 
claims to satisfy jurisdictional requirements by waiving the government’s 
immunity will allow our nation to begin the process of relieving this tension and 
remedying one of its most egregious acts. 
The Tucker Act, framed appropriately, remains a potentially viable waiver 
of sovereign immunity for African American reparations claims. But there is 
little doubt that convincing an American court that the Tucker Act satisfies the 
jurisdictional requirement for a reparations claim will be an uphill battle. 
Objections to such claims based on statutes of limitations or causation will 
remain. An objection regarding the legislative intent of the statute may also be 
made, namely that Congress did not intend for the Tucker Act to make 
reparations available to African Americans, considering the country’s racial 
315. A useful comparison is the Black Farmers case, a successful class action racial 
discrimination suit that could be characterized as a rare example of a successful reparations claim. 
See Kindaka Jamal Sanders, Re-Assembling Osiris: Rule 23, the Black Farmers Case, and 
Reparations, 118 PENN ST. L. REV. 339, 365–67 (2013) (discussing class certification requirements 
as a model for reparations litigation to meet standing and causation requirements).  
316. The prevalence of the Internet will make use of genealogical and family tree services 
easier and cheaper. Access to the Internet is a free service available at virtually all public libraries 
in the United States. But cf. Kevin Hopkins, Forgive U.S. Our Debts? Righting the Wrongs of 
Slavery, 89 GEO. L.J. 2531, 2542–43 (2001) (arguing that technological advances do not solve the 
cost and access problems of genealogical research). 
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climate in 1887. Nevertheless, a plain reading of the statute grants jurisdiction to 
any plaintiff regarding claims founded upon the Constitution or Acts of 
Congress.317 
The Civil Rights Act of 1886, the Thirteenth Amendment, and the 
Freedmen’s Bureau Bill each meet the threshold requirement. As discussed 
above, no court has yet considered reparations claims based on the breach of 
common law trust suffered by African Americans. The Freedmen’s Bureau Act 
granted legislative authority and formality to the nation’s common law fiduciary 
duties formed shortly prior. It is clear that the government intended to exert 
domination and control over the work product, personhood, belongings, and 
property rights of African Americans when it established the Freedman’s 
Bureau.318 
Although no court has yet considered reparations claims brought under the 
Tucker Act, refusal by any court to recognize the jurisdictional applicability of 
the Tucker Act to African American reparations suits premised on a breach of 
trust theory would be plainly unjust. In fact, it would amount to denying judicial 
remedy to a certain group of American citizens, in direct contradiction to the 
Act’s purpose to provide what “every civilized nation of the world has already 
done—the right to go into the courts to seek redress against the Government for 
their grievances.”319 To deny the viable claims of African Americans, who for 
centuries were subjected to inhumane treatment and laws, based upon a narrow 
interpretation of the Tucker Act would amount to a denial of rights and 
protection under the law sadly reminiscent of slavery and its aftermath. 
The application of the Tucker Act to breaches of trust committed in 
violation of the government’s fiduciary duties owed to African Americans (as 
detailed in the Freedmen’s Bureau Act) is appropriate. The Tucker Act provides 
a jurisdictional waiver of sovereign immunity when combined with a right to 
relief. As discussed in Part IV.B below, the Freedmen’s Bureau Bill imposed 
duties on the government whose breach creates a substantive right to money 
damages from the United States. 
B. Breach of a Common Law Trust Relationship as Establishing a Right to an
Accounting and Monetary Damages 
The Freedmen’s Bureau Bill was the primary means by which Congress 
exerted “elaborate control” over African Americans, similar to the statutes and 
regulations at issue in Mitchell II.320 Although the bill does not expressly 
317. 28 U.S.C. § 1491(a)(1) (2012).
318. See FONER, supra note 230, at 68–69 (describing how the Commission that
recommended the Bureau’s creation characterized its role towards African Americans as 
“benevolent guardianship”). 
319. See United States v. Mitchell (Mitchell II), 463 U.S. 206, 213–14 (1983).
320. For a discussion on the potential applicability of 25 U.S.C. § 1983 (2012) as a statutory
source for reparations, see BITTKER, supra note 158, at 30–35. 
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authorize money damages, under the reasoning of Mitchell II, the government’s 
control created a common law trust relationship and corresponding fiduciary 
relationship. The law of trusts clearly provides for judicial recognition of the 
presence of a common law trust relationship between a group of people and the 
government when elaborate control or supervision of that group is exercised by 
the government. Once that relationship is established, the award of damages for 
a breach of fiduciary duties in a suit for reparations is a straightforward 
application of traditional trust law principles. The provision of discovery and 
expert opinions in civil litigation will provide any trier of fact with the requisite 
numbers to calculate an appropriate remedy. 
As provided by Mitchell II, Cobell, and White Apache Mountain, the form 
of reparations contemplated in this article consists of a formal accounting and 
monetary reimbursements with the central goal of redress. Those 
reimbursements could be made in the form of government-sponsored grants for 
education, investments, and/or direct payments. Regardless of the form or 
method of redress, these reparations should be made to a specific class of 
African Americans for loss of inheritances and familial wealth denied to eligible 
descendants as a result of the government’s breach and mismanagement of 
African American labor, wages, and designated land. 
CONCLUSION 
The freedoms and rights guaranteed to all other citizens have not been 
granted to African Americans. Indeed, the very government entrusted with the 
duty to protect the life and liberty of all its citizens has instead prioritized its own 
interests and the interests of white America. In fact, since 1989, Congress has 
repeatedly refused to even pass legislation investigating the possibility of 
African American reparations.321 All the while, African Americans have been 
denied judicial remedies from the government under the cloak of sovereign 
immunity. This treatment and denial of justice is unique to African Americans. 
As a result, more than a century after the end of legalized slavery and nearly 
fifty years after the end of legalized segregation in the United States, the federal 
321. Every year since 1989, Representative John Conyers of Michigan has put before 
Congress the Commission to Study Reparation Proposals for African-Americans Act. See H.R. 40, 
113th Cong. (2013). The Act calls for a comprehensive assessment of the effects of slavery and 
discrimination on blacks, including the federal and state governments’ roles in those effects. 
Congress should advance this bill out of committee, where it has sat for the last several decades. 
This study would serve as a first step by the government to acknowledge the injury it has caused 
and begin to make amends. Though this article strongly supports the position that judicial action is 
possible and equitable, the availability of judicial remedy does not relieve Congress of its moral 
and legal obligation to right the wrongs of the United States government. To that end, an explicit 
waiver of sovereign immunity and establishment of a payment fund, similar to that provided in the 
Civil Liberties Act of 1988, is long overdue. 
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government continues to abdicate its responsibility to rectify the harm its breach 
caused to African Americans.322 
A reparations suit based on the common law trust relationship creates the 
possibility of avoiding the issue of sovereign immunity raised by previous 
lawsuits. None of the recent cases seeking reparations for African Americans 
have pursued a breach of duty action based on the common law trust relationship 
between the United States and a specific class of African Americans. The 
holdings in Cobell, Mitchell II, and White Apache Mountain Tribe provide 
judicial precedent for a waiver of sovereign immunity and a substantive right to 
monetary damages when a common law trust relationship exists. The logic 
underpinning these holdings warrants extending them to the government’s 
common law trust relationship with African Americans. Such an action could 
provide a legal basis for a class of African American plaintiffs to request an 
accounting of the government’s actions as required under the Freedmen’s Bureau 
Bill. 
The American court system should be provoked by its interests in equity and 
justice, using the backdrop of the Native American breach of trust and fiduciary 
duty cases, to provide redress for its bigoted, institutionalized racial hierarchy as 
it related to African Americans and truly begin the process of healing race 
relations in the United States. 
322. Ogletree, supra note 16, at 290 (discussing how Representative John Conyers’s bill to
establish a commission to investigate reparations had failed to achieve widespread support, despite 
being filed annually for decades).  
